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1. The History of Chance: Physics and Metaphysics 
 
 Probability as we know and use it nowadays was born in the 17th 
century, in the context of disputes within the Catholic Church regarding the 
nature of evidence. It was born as a dual, or Janus-faced concept (Hacking, 
1975), endowed with both ontological and epistemic significance. Arnauld, 
Pascal and Leibniz emphasised its epistemological salience, while Huygens, 
Bernoulli and, later, Laplace and Poincaré focused on the ontological 
implications. The hybrid nature continues to this day. 
 
 In this chapter I am concerned with the application of the ontological 
dimension of probability to physical chance. It is therefore to Huygens that I 
turn in this section for some historical background. Yet, in addressing 
contemporary debates, it often helps to be reminded that probability remains 
stubbornly hybrid. Thus, the foundations of decision theory (e.g. in Pascal’s 
wager) require some antecedent objective chances; and more generally the 
cogency of subjective probability requires objective probabilistic 
independence (Gillies, 2000). Similarly, single case chances in the sciences 
have often been supposed to be essentially subjective or to require some 
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subjective or otherwise pragmatic rules of application or analyses (Howson 
and Urbach, 1989 (1993), p. 346; Lewis, 1986). Yet, such analyses often 
arguably presuppose the reality of objective chance. Not surprisingly, the 
essential duality of probability, as we shall see, becomes characteristic of 
debates on the nature of physical and quantum chance. 
 
 It is worth recalling that historically a certain sense of metaphysical 
chance predates – and in fact contributes to – the genesis of probability. And 
although our full contemporary notion of lawful chance does not arise until 
the end of the 19th century, the practice of employing statistical measures to 
represent objective or ontological chance is already well established in the 
17th century. The connection between ratios in populations and a primitive 
sense of “probability” is already present in Fracastoro and other renaissance 
scholars (Hacking, 1975, Ch. 3). But objective chance first fully emerges in 
the work of Christian Huygens (1657), who is perhaps the first to distinguish 
different statistics in a population. Huygens’ defence of the distinction 
between the average mean age of a population and its life expectancy 
implicitly deploys estimates for objective chance of any individual to live up 
to a certain age. The difference between the mean and the expectation is of 
course critically important for very skewed distributions, or those with a large 
standard deviation, but remains largely invisible in well behaved (i.e. 
symmetrical and smooth) distributions over homogenous populations.  
 
 For a discrete random variable X, its expected value is calculated as a 
weighted average, with the weights representing probabilities, as follows: 𝐸 𝑋 = 𝑝 𝑥& 𝐴(𝑥&)*&+, , where xi is the ith value of the discrete random 
variable X, and pi is its probability. In the case of a continuous random 
variable, we compute its value as: 𝐸 𝑥 = 𝑥𝑓 𝑥 𝑑𝑥/010 , where 𝑓(𝑥) is the 
probability density function for the random variable x. 
  
 The relevant philosophical question concerns the interpretation of 𝑝(𝑥), and 𝑓(𝑥). Huygens assumes that these functions describe objective 
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chance since he models them after a lottery, i.e. the typical game of chance 
at the time (Hald, 2003, p. 108). The chances of a lottery game are 
arithmetic (assuming the equi-probability of drawing any one ticket rather 
than another). Hence the only thing that matters is the relative proportion of 
tickets with the same “value” in the overall pack. In the case of life 
expectancy, which we may also take to be the result of some underlying 
probability distribution over some discrete variable (age of death) defined 
over a population, it is the proportion of people in each subdivision of age. 
And this is thus implicitly taken to be just as objective as the arithmetic 
proportion of tickets of each kind in a pack. The question, however, is what 
precise objective property of people (the elements of the population) this 
probability picks out. From this point onwards, it becomes possible to 
distinguish “objective probability”, as the formal concept, from “chance”, as 
whatever objective property in the world the formal concept picks out. 
 
 Similar conceptions of objective chance underpin Laplace’s later work 
(Laplace, 1814). Laplace is sometimes celebrated as the champion and 
pioneer of a purely epistemic conception of probability, according to which 
the underlying dynamical laws of the universe are deterministic and 
probability represents only a certain degree of ignorance or lack of 
knowledge regarding initial conditions. But this is arguably a 
misrepresentation of Laplace’s philosophy of probability, which combines 
both ontological and epistemic aspects. Laplace explicitly defines probability 
as the ratio of actual to total equi-possible cases (the so-called classical 
definition of mathematical probability as a ratio: #	456&7&89	:;696#9<=&4566&>?9	:;696). The 
definition is fulfilled by any proportion of an attribute in an actual class, and 
Laplace was given to generalizing it to situations where the cases 
considered are not equi-possible because they are not equi-probable. But 
even to state this requires an antecedent notion of objective equi-probability 
or chance – which Laplace is content to deploy at leisure. 
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2. Chance and the Interpretation of Probability 
 
 The most important philosophical question then concerns the 
interpretation of objective probability – and, most particularly, the question 
regarding the property of statistical populations that any statement of 
objective probability effectively picks out. Philosophers have grappled with 
this issue in different ways. Two main interpretations of objective probability 
that have emerged are the frequency and the propensity interpretations. The 
frequency interpretation was most explicitly championed by Von Mises 
(1928) and Reichenbach (1949). It is driven largely by empiricist concerns to 
keep the concept of chance firmly grounded in experience, and equates 
chance with stable frequencies in repeatable sequences of experimental 
outcomes. The propensity interpretation, on the other hand, is often 
associated with Popper (1959) although it has marked antecedents in late 
19th century thought (Peirce, 1910). It is rather driven by an abductive 
understanding of chance attribution as an explanatory practice, and equates 
chance with the tendencies in chancy objects to generate certain outcomes. 
(More precisely, in Popper’s (1959) and Gillies’ (2000) theories, with the 
dispositions of chance set-ups to yield stable frequencies of such outcomes 
in the long run). Of course, both ratios or proportions in populations, and 
dispositions and tendencies have a much longer philosophical history; their 
explicit association to probability and chance is, however, more of a fin de 
siècle development.  
 
 Hence the frequency interpretation assumes that a probability 
statement is meaningful if and only if it refers – implicitly if not explicitly – to a 
sequence or class of outcome events of an experimental set up of a certain 
kind. The statement of probability is then to be understood as the statement 
of the proportion of the outcome events in that sequence that possess a 
certain attribute. Hence, consider the attribute A in an appropriate finite 
sequence of observed outcome events 𝑆 = {𝑠,, 𝑠D, … , 𝑠*}, where we assume 
without loss of generality that n is even. A certain subset forming an 
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appropriate subsequence is 𝑆G = 𝑠,H, … , 𝑠IH , with 𝑚 ≤ 𝑛, containing all and 
only those elements in S that possess the attribute A. The probability of A in 
S, according to the frequency interpretation, is simply the ratio of positive 
cases in S’ to all cases in S. Thus, if the rule that picks out the elements in 
the subsequence is, for example, one that selects each odd placed element 
in the original sequence, this is in effect ½, since it is guaranteed to pick out 
half of the original members.  
 
 The above notion is simple, in line with Laplace’s classical definition, 
and seems straightforward to apply. However, it gives rise to a very large 
number of decisive difficulties regarding: i) the rule that picks out the 
subsequence, ii) the ‘appropriateness’ of the sequences, iii) the fact that the 
sequences are finite, and iv) the role that frequencies, vis-a-vis probabilities, 
play in scientific practice. (For a summary of these and other objections see 
Hajek, 1997 and 2008). They all come to the fore when we consider a real-
life ordinary case of physical chance – such as the chance of heads up in 
tossing a regular coin. If the tossing device is genuinely random, and the 
coin is fair, we expect this to be ½. Yet, there is no rule that picks out the 
subsequence S’ of tosses with the relevant attribute (‘heads up’); this is 
precisely part of what makes the generating device a random one. Hence 
there is no simple prescription for any rule that will do the required job. (In 
Von Mises’ terms,1928, p. 24, there is no place-selection rule).  
 
 Secondly, nothing can prevent an accidentally biased series of 
outcomes with the relevant attribute in any finite sequence. This is evident if 
we consider a short experimental run of 10 coin tosses: the likelihood of 
obtaining precisely 5 heads is in practice less than one, however fair the 
coin. Yet, any other frequency may not be representative but accidental. The 
difficulty does not go away however long we let the experiment run for, for 
the sequence is finite – as it inevitably must be given the limited time span of 
any real experiment. This has severe implications for the probability of single 
events, which on this theory are strictly meaningless. Thus there is on this 
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view no “probability of the battle of Waterloo”, or “probability that an atom will 
decay this minute”, etc. 
 
 As a possible solution, if the sequence is well-behaved, the frequency 
of the attribute may possess a limit, and we can take the limit to be the 
probability. So only certain sequences will do, namely those that have a 
stable limiting frequency of the attribute in question (“collectives” in Von 
Mises’s terminology, 1928, p. 11). But, and here comes the third set of 
issues, probability is now identified with a frequency in an infinite sequence; 
or with a mathematical limiting property of the sequence. Both solutions are 
problematic for an empiricist conception of chance, since they do not identify 
probability with any actual frequency in a sequence. The former identifies it 
with a hypothetical entity (an infinite sequence of experimental outcomes); 
the latter identifies it with an abstract mathematical property (a limit). 
 
 Finally, there are issues related to explanation (see e.g. Emery, 2015).  
Probabilities in physics and ordinary life are routinely employed to explain 
sequences of observable data. The probability for a coin to land heads 
explains the long run or limiting frequency; the probability of a given 
chemical element to decay (its half-life) explains the long run frequency of 
decay in any sample of the given chemical material; and so on. Yet, on the 
frequency interpretation, probabilities are frequencies; and it is very hard to 
see how frequencies can explain other frequencies (except perhaps in the 
trivial and unenlightening sense of subsuming them as sub-sequences). 
 
 This last problem points towards the alternative objective 
interpretation of chance as propensity – a dispositional property of the 
experimental or chance set up that gives rise to well-behaved sequences or 
collectives. The view expresses an abandonment of any strict or reductive 
empiricism. On this view probabilities are linked to the dispositional 
properties of chancy systems, or entire experimental setups, and these are 
not themselves necessarily observable or empirically accessible. (N.B. The 
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view is not however incompatible with a mild form of empiricism that 
recommends chances to be estimated from empirical data; and for evidence 
to be brought to bear for or against any given chance attribution). While the 
propensity interpretation of probability overcomes the previously described 
difficulties for frequencies (in some cases trivially since it does not identify 
probability with any frequency in any sequence), it nonetheless has 
problems of its own. The most notable one is ‘Humphreys’ paradox’, which 
concerns the interpretation of inverse probabilities. For any well-defined 
conditional probability 𝑃 𝐴 𝐵  its inverse 𝑃 (𝐵 𝐴) is also well defined; yet a 
propensity is asymmetrical precisely because it is explanatory, and most 
explanations are asymmetric. Several scholars have argued, following 
Humphreys (1985), that probabilities cannot thereby be identified with 
propensities, but must be conceptually distinguished from them (see Suárez, 
2014 for a review).  
 
 While these disputes about chance in the first instance concern its 
conceptual analysis – what Carnap (1950) refers to as ‘external questions’ – 
they can also become rather substantial, requiring an assessment of both 
the coherence of each account, and its fit with both experimental data and, 
more generally, scientific practice. Not only have such philosophical disputes 
played an enormously important role in the history of probability, but they 
continue to play an enormously important role in contemporary debates 
regarding the nature of physical chance. Philosophers of physics often 
appeal to probability and its interpretation as part of their intended solution to 
many present day conceptual puzzles. And, as it happens, it matters greatly 
what kind of underlying interpretation they hold. I here make a preliminary 
case for a type of propensity interpretation, but I mainly aim to show that 
chance may be fruitfully applied in different areas of physics regardless of 
underlying assumptions about determinism.  
 
 
3. Chance in Deterministic Physics 
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 Pierre-Simon Laplace first introduced the thesis of universal 
determinism, which he regarded a consequence of the dynamical laws of 
Newtonian mechanics. Newton’s second law in particular, defines a 
configuration of positions and forces at any given moment in time, and its 
formulation in a differential equation with respect to time allows us to 
calculate the dynamical evolution of a system for any arbitrary future time: 𝐹 = 𝑚 PQRP7R. Laplace also came up with what is nowadays known as 
“Laplace’s demon”: the thought that if universal determinism is true then for 
a fully omniscient intelligence, who could know the present and past state of 
the universe in its entire detail, “nothing would be uncertain, and the future 
just like the past would be laid out before her eyes” (1814, p. 4). If universal 
determinism is true, the past state of the universe is the total cause of its 
present state, and its present state is the total cause of any of its future 
states. Therefore, full knowledge of the state of the universe at any stage in 
its evolution guarantees full knowledge of its state at any other stage. In 
such a universe, endowed with universal deterministic dynamics, nothing 
would be left to chance. There would be no role for ontological probability 
because there would be no objective physical chance. Call this Laplace’s 
thesis (though it is unclear that it is in fact due to Laplace): the only reason 
there are probabilities in classical physics is that our cognitive limits as 
human beings require them. Probability becomes a necessary tool for 
prediction for those less than omniscient intelligences like ours: It measures 
our lack of knowledge or ignorance of the actual conditions of the universe, 
thus allowing us to compute future states within the bounds of our ignorance. 
 
 Laplace’s thesis has exerted profound influence on the philosophy of 
probability, as well as scientific theorising about chance. Many contemporary 
metaphysical accounts of chance (such as e.g. Lewis, 1986) are heavily in 
its debt. Yet, the thesis can be and has been contested. There are three 
main objections. Firstly, it is unclear that Newtonian dynamics in fact entails 
universal determinism. Secondly, even if it does, it is unclear that the rest of 
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physics, never mind the rest of science, has dynamical laws akin to 
Newton’s second law. Thirdly, it is unclear that universal determinism rules 
out ontological probability anyway. The third argument is obviously most 
relevant to our discussion, but the first two also have some interest.  
 
 Earman (1986) notoriously introduced the view that Newtonian 
mechanics is far from trivially deterministic (the view has antecedents in 
Born, 1969). His main examples were related to time-reversed unboundedly 
accelerated objects, also known as “space invaders” (see Hoefer, 2003, for 
a review). These objects are theoretically possible in classical mechanics, 
yet it is completely undetermined at what stage, if any, in the evolution of the 
world they come into being. 
 
 Norton (2003) introduced what is nowadays the best-known example 
of a Newtonian system with an indeterministic dynamics – the so-called 
“Norton’s dome”. This is an imaginary concrete object that obeys the laws of 
Newtonian mechanics – by definition. Yet, as can be purportedly 
demonstrated by performing a thought experiment on it, it is an openly 
indeterministic system, since it admits more than one possible state 
evolution (in fact an infinite number of possible future state evolutions) 
consistent with its present state. The dome is (Norton, 2008, p. 787) a 
radially symmetric surface with a shape defined by: ℎ = (2 3𝑔) 𝑟X D, where r 
is the radial distance coordinate in the surface of the dome, h is the vertical 
distance below the apex at 𝑟 = 0, and g is the constant acceleration of a free 
mass of unit value in the vertical – i.e. downwards -- gravitational field 
surrounding the surface (Figure 1):  
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Fig 1: Norton’s Dome © John Norton  
 
 The thought experiment involves placing a point-like body of unit mass 
on the apex, and letting it evolve freely in time. Newtonian mechanics entails 
that the acceleration of this point-like unit mass is given by: ZI = PR[P7R = 𝑟, D. 
This dynamical law has not one but two solutions, namely:  
 
i) 𝑟 𝑡 = 0, which entails that the point-like mass remains at rest at 
the apex for any future time; and 
 
ii) 𝑟 𝑡 = 1 144 𝑡 − 𝑇 D, 𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑡 ≥ 𝑇0, 𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 , which curiously entails that, 
after some arbitrary time T, the point-like mass starts to descend 
along any arbitrary radial direction down the dome’s surface. 
 
 Norton (2008) makes the point that while one could lay out a 
probability distribution over the alternative radial directions down the dome 
(where each direction has the same probability) it does not seem possible to 
similarly lay out a probability distribution over time intervals [0, 𝑇] such that 
the descent will begin within the given interval of time. Since 𝑇 → ∞, each 
such interval should receive probability zero, thus making it certain that no 
descent takes place, contrary to both common sense and the mathematical 
solution. Thus, it is not only indeterministic whether the point like mass rests 
r=0
h = 
(2/3g)r3/2
F = r1/2
r
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indefinitely, or descends; it also fails to be determinable at what time it will 
move if it does. Norton argues moreover this precise moment cannot be 
determined even up to a certain probability (because time is modelled on the 
real number continuum, so the only consistent ascription of probability to any 
given interval within Newtonian mechanics is exactly zero). Yet, while it is 
true that Newtonian mechanics provides no prescription of probabilities for 
either Earman’s “space invaders” or Norton’s “motion down the dome”, it is 
nonetheless always possible to impose a suitable measure. For example, a 
monotonically increasing measure that makes it increasingly more probable 
as time goes on, until a certain finite time greater than the start of motion 
time is reached, then apportions whatever probability remains to the infinite 
amount of time left. Norton himself (2003, p. 10, footnote 8) proposes a 
different measure in agreement with exponential decay. This is sufficient to 
show that Laplace’s thesis is false – objective chances are not incompatible 
with Newtonian dynamics. (Opponents of the compatibility of chance and 
determinism are likely to demur; in particular they are likely to impose 
additional external constraints on the measures so as to rule out non-trivial 
chances for any motions on Norton’s dome – yet, it remains relevant that 
those constraints are external, and that nothing in Newtonian mechanics per 
se seems to require them). 
 
 Secondly, there are of course “classical” theories other than 
Newtonian mechanics. Earman (1986, Ch. IV) argues that in fact the most 
hospitable environment for determinism is not Newtonian mechanics but the 
special theory of relativity. But, again, while the theory does not provide 
probabilities, e.g. for world-lines, nothing seems to preclude imposing them 
from outside the theory. As for classical statistical mechanics, the debate 
has centred upon whether it reduces thermodynamics and its arrow of time 
(see chapter 7c in the present volume). The issue of reduction is tangential 
to our purposes, but the presumption that statistical mechanics is 
deterministic is of course not. There are some arguments to the effect that 
statistical mechanics is compatible with objective chance, and some 
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classical phenomena – such as Brownian motion – seem to presuppose 
essential stochasticity in the motion of free particles. There is no space to 
pursue the matter further here, but many authors through the years have 
argued that statistical mechanics not only fails to be fully deterministic in 
Laplace’s sense but in fact requires some probabilistic or stochastic 
assumptions to get its predictions off the ground (see Clark, 1987; or the 
fascinating discussion initiated by Albert, 2000). 
 
 Even if we were to suppose that both relativity and statistical 
mechanics are fully deterministic, Laplace’s thesis does not follow unless 
Newtonian mechanics is so too. For all these theories assume that in the 
relevant limit (of small displacements in a flat Minkowski space-time, and of 
microscopic particle free motions), Newtonian mechanics does apply (to the 
slow motion of bodies in a flat spacetime relative to one another, and to the 
motion and interactions of free single particle systems). These theories are 
therefore required to accept the possibility of deterministic chance in the 
limit. So Earman’s and Norton’s arguments cut to the bone of Laplace’s 
thesis for all “classical” theories that accept Newtonian mechanics is the 
relevant limit. In such classical approximations, Laplace’s theory cannot be 
true unless Newtonian mechanics precludes objective chance. (I am 
assuming that none of these classical approximations fundamentally 
replaces classical physics in its proper domain). 
 
 There is yet a third argument against Laplace’s thesis. It is somewhat 
related to the previous two, but works entirely within deterministic Newtonian 
physics. That is, suppose for the sake of argument that the universal 
dynamics of Newton’s laws is indeed fully deterministic. It is then true that 
the present state of the universe determines every future state. And it is 
indeed true that the full and complete initial state of the universe suffices to 
fix completely every later state of the universe. It does not yet follow that 
there is no room for chance. Poincaré (1896) was perhaps the first to 
observe that a distribution function over the initial values of the dynamical 
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variables of a deterministic system can give rise to probability distributions 
over the evolved values of related dynamical variables, provided some 
assumptions regarding the continuity and smoothness of both initial 
distribution and dynamics are met. 
 
  It stands to reason that if the initial distribution function characterises 
or represents our lack of knowledge, the final chance distribution represents 
an epistemic probability. But as Poincaré himself noted, the initial distribution 
function typically characterises not ignorance, but the actual frequencies of 
the initial variables. The dynamics then generate a final chance distribution 
that there is every reason to believe is objective (Poincaré, 1912). Not only 
that; Poincaré showed that – modulo the assumptions – the final chance 
distribution function is a characteristic of the system which is quite 
independent of the specific initial distribution over frequencies. Hence it is 
possible to assume any arbitrary initial function that fulfils the conditions in 
order to calculate the objective final probability distribution (what has come 
to be known as the ‘method of arbitrary functions’). Most games of chance 
satisfy Poincaré’s continuity and smoothness assumptions. In a game of 
roulette – Poincaré’s own example – the long run probability of a red or black 
outcome is the same, irrespective of the frequency distribution over the 
direction and strength of the initial throw of the ball on the roulette - as long 
as the forces impinged in the initial throws satisfy the smoothness and 
continuity assumptions.  
 
 Strevens (2013) builds on Poincaré’s theorem to argue that the causal 
mechanisms in the chance set up by themselves dynamically generate the 
resulting objective chance distribution. For instance, the dynamics of the 
shaking of a die in a cup is such that the resulting distribution of velocities 
and positions of the die as it leaves the cup satisfies all the dynamical 
conditions (microconstancy and microlinearity, in Strevens’ terminology) to 
generate the familiar 1/6th chance for each side landing up – and this is so 
regardless of the precise initial conditions as the die is thrown into the cup. 
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In other words: objective chance is a dynamical epi-phenomenon of 
complexity – quite independently of whether the underlying dynamics is 
deterministic or not. 
 
 
4. Chance in Indeterministic Physics 
 
 Quantum mechanics (QM) is widely assumed to provide the paradigm 
examples of physical chance. It is supposed to furnish a radically distinct 
description that replaces classical mechanics at the fundamental level. Its 
inception 90 years ago certainly ushered in a golden era for physical 
indeterminism, and the amazing empirical successes of QM have often been 
assumed to sound the death knell for Laplace’s thesis – by simply showing 
classical physics to be false. The uncertainty principle, as usually 
understood, prevents any quantum system from possessing values of 
conjugate observables simultaneously. Thus, no quantum particle may 
possess e.g. precise position and momentum simultaneously. More 
generally a system in a superposition state of eigenstates of a particular 
observable, may not be said to have any precise value of the observable in 
question – instead QM predicts very precisely the probabilities for the 
different values of the observable. What value it ultimately has on 
measurement can only be left to ‘chance’. 
 
 This kind of stochastic chance was introduced into QM by Max Born 
(1926) with his celebrated probability rule – according to which the 
normalized square modulus of the amplitude of the wave-function provides 
the precise probabilities for the different values of the relevant observable. 
Its introduction was notoriously resisted, e.g. by Schrödinger and Einstein. 
The latter is famously supposed to have quipped something to the effect 
that: “God does not play dice” (Pais, 1982, Ch. 25). And not surprisingly, 
given the long shadow cast by Laplace’s thesis, all these authors ipso facto 
rebelled against the indeterministic character of QM – and attempted to 
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restore determinism instead. The most sophisticated such attempt has 
proven to be David Bohm’s theory, nowadays known as Bohmian mechanics 
(see chapter 4d in the present volume). It provides a Hamiltonian 
reformulation of QM in terms of ‘hidden’ variables. In Bohm’s theory, 
quantum systems possess values of all their dynamical properties all the 
time, although these values are not knowable with precision. The uncertainty 
principle is thus understood as a statement not of ontological indeterminacy 
or chance, but of epistemic limitation – it purports to show what limits there 
are on our knowledge of the evolution of a system at any time, given some 
initial uncertainty as to what the original values of its dynamical properties 
are. Laplace’s shadow looms large here too: for an omniscient being, there 
would no uncertainty at any stage, since the Bohmian equations of motion 
are entirely in keeping with the deterministic character of classical 
Newtonian dynamics.   
 
 In other words, much discussion of stochastic chance in QM is 
predicated upon an understanding of classical dynamics that very much 
aligns it to Laplace’s thesis. Both defenders and detractors of quantum 
chance share the view that a deterministic completion of QM in terms of 
hidden variables would compromise, if not simply eliminate, quantum 
chance. Yet, as noted in the previous section, classical determinism is not in 
fact incompatible with objective chance: Laplace’s thesis may be false even 
if determinism is true. Not surprisingly, I shall argue, some of the discussions 
on the nature of quantum chance have similarly gone awry. Stochastic 
quantum chance is an explicit axiom in some interpretations of QM (such as 
collapse interpretations). But even those interpretations that do not make it 
explicit or axiomatic (such as Bohmian mechanics and the many worlds 
interpretation), nonetheless allow quantum chance.  
 
 Collapse theories explicitly deny that the dynamical laws of quantum 
mechanics are deterministic. Physical laws fix the evolution of the states of 
systems (where the state of a system provides a catalogue of all its 
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properties and their values at a given time). Now, according to collapse 
interpretations quantum states are unlike classical states in that they are 
subject to two different kinds of evolution. The first kind of evolution is 
governed by the Schrödinger equation, which is a deterministic equation 
over the wave-function: given the wave-function at any time, Schrödinger 
evolution fixes uniquely the wave-function at any later time. Yet, this is not a 
classical deterministic evolution because the wave-function is not a literal or 
univocal description of the ontology of the quantum system (extant 
approaches include the “flash” and “mass density” ontologies – see e.g. 
Esfeld and Gisin, 2014 – and on neither of them does the wave function in 
fact represent a wave). Rather, as noted previously, Born’s probability rule 
only lets us calculate probabilities for outcomes of measurements out of the 
wavefunction.  
 
 The standard rule for the interpretation of the wave-function is the so-
called eigenstate-eigenvalue (“e/e”) link, according to which a quantum 
system may be said to possess a value of the property represented by a 
self-adjoint operator Ô if and only if the system is in an eigenstate of Ô. For 
most states, this means that the system lacks a value for most of the 
relevant dynamical properties (all those represented by operators that do not 
commute with Ô). Collapse interpretations then postulate a second kind of 
openly non-deterministic evolution in order to account for the fact that 
measurements of any dynamical property on a quantum system routinely 
obtain definite results. This is the “collapse” dynamical rule: a near 
instantaneous evolution of the system that takes its state to the eigenstate of 
the relevant operator with a certain probability. 
 
 Collapse interpretations differ on how, when and how often this type of 
indeterministic evolution takes place. The original collapse interpretation of 
Von Neumann (1932) invokes a principle of psycho-physical parallelism to 
suggest that collapse takes place whenever the measurement apparatus is 
apprehended (perceived) by a conscious observer. It is the interaction of 
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mind with matter that forces the indeterministic evolution. The Ghirardi-
Rimini-Weber (GRW) interpretation asserts that collapses of the 
wavefunction occur spontaneously. The relaxation and free time parameters 
are sufficiently regular and sudden that no measurement interaction in the 
real world can ever detect a system in a state other than a ‘collapsed’ one 
(Ghirardi et al. (1986). In the Quantum State Diffusion (QSD) approach 
collapses take place whenever a system interacts with its complex 
environment. Since, on this view, systems are typically open (Percival, 
1999), environmental interaction is also typical, the many degrees of 
freedom of the environment dominate, and regular stochastic evolutions on 
the states of quantum systems are induced. Regardless of these differences 
all collapse theories are committed to stochastic quantum chances. (Suárez, 
2007; Frigg and Hoefer, 2007). 
 
 Other interpretations of quantum mechanics reject any collapse 
postulate, or indeterministic evolution. They assert that the Schrödinger 
equation has no exceptions and Schrödinger evolution is the only kind. Most 
prominent amongst this is the Everett relative state formulation – sometimes 
known as the many worlds interpretation. It too provides its own 
interpretation of the wavefunction and its connections with property values. 
Many worlds views assert the reality of a universal wavefunction – a giant 
superposition of tensor product states of the different interacting parts of the 
microscopic and macroscopic world alike. The appearances of definiteness 
are recovered in each branch of the universal wavefunction. Hence there is 
no indeterminism or collapse, and the quantum probabilities merely 
represent the weights that different appearances carry in the universal 
wavefunction. Still, questions must be raised about the meaning of these 
“weights”. Putnam (2005) argues that many-worlds interpretations lack the 
resources to account for such weights as probabilities. Defenders of the 
many-worlds approach have tended to respond to such worries by appealing 
to decision theoretic arguments (Deutsch, 1999; Wallace, 2010). But it is not 
at all clear that such appeals ultimately do away with quantum chance. For a 
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start, it is implausible that such decision theoretic arguments correspond to 
the subjective probabilities of any particular situated agent. More importantly, 
it is symptomatic that appeals to decision theoretic reasoning often 
presuppose rather than eliminate objective chances. This is an objection that 
any attentive historian of probability will find familiar. Pascal founded modern 
decision theory with his wager (Hacking, 1972). But in order to show that 
theism was superior on decision theoretic grounds he needed to make 
substantial assumptions regarding both the natural chance of God’s 
existence and the objective utility derived from salvation. Contemporary 
defences of decision-theoretic grounds for wavefunction realism often mirror 
Pascal’s difficulties: objective quantum chances are presupposed rather than 
derived (Jansson, 2016). If so, far from avoiding stochastic quantum 
chances, many-worlds interpretations sneak them in through the back door. 
   
 The one version of QM that was constructed with the explicit aim of 
eliminating or rendering otiose any ontological quantum chance is Bohmian 
mechanics (Bohm and Hiley, 1993). Yet, as I already noted, the argument 
from Bohmian mechanics against chance runs perilously close to the non-
sequitur that assimilates the reality of chance to underlying indeterminism. 
Bohmian mechanics asserts that the only dynamical law is the Schrödinger 
equation – thus the wavefunction evolves deterministically. However, 
Bohmian mechanics also asserts that the quantum state is not the full state 
of a quantum object, which significantly include hidden variables. These 
have their own deterministic dynamics. Poincaré’s method of arbitrary 
functions then applies, so long as the initial values of the hidden variables 
are not uniquely distributed but met the usual continuity assumptions. The 
frequencies of those values then suffice to generate objective probability 
distributions over the system’s final values via the deterministic dynamics. In 
other words, it follows that any statistical distribution over the initial values of 
such hidden variables can generate objective chance distributions down the 
road (Suárez, 2015 argues further for an interpretation of these as 
manifesting underlying dispositions).  
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5 Conclusions 
 
 Objective chance appears to play a critical role in physics. Yet, 
Laplace’s thesis states that in classical physics chance is rendered otiose to 
an omniscient being. Probability may only represent the cognitive 
shortcomings of an epistemically limited agent – his or her lack of 
knowledge. Despite its profound influence, Laplace’s thesis does not hold in 
general. Classical physics does not require determinism; and determinism 
does not preclude chance. It follows that chance cannot be eliminated or 
done away by simply re-formulating or modelling stochastic phenomena 
within classical physics. On the contrary, physical chance can be objective 
regardless of the dynamical character of physical laws. No wonder that the 
debate regarding the nature of chance – its metaphysics – shows no sign of 
abating. It certainly matters what physical chance is, for it impacts greatly 
upon our understanding of the underlying physics. 
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